Introduction
Increasingly, philosophers of language are turning their attention to pejorative expressions as providing novel cases against which to measure theories of meaning and understanding, and with which to test accounts of the mechanisms operative in the use of language and the principles governing such use. In addition, philosophers working in metaethics are investigating the extent to which pejoratives provide a model by which to understand the meaning and use of ethical expressions. One might hope that, if theorists of any sort could achieve a better understanding of how pejorative language functions and its significance, they might have a better understanding of how to tackle and respond to the abuses of such language.
Pejorative expressions come in different varieties, including swear words (e.g., 'shit', 'fuck'), insults (e.g., 'dick', 'bastard') and slurs (e.g., 'faggot', 'nigger'). 1 One should not assume that what one has to say about one variety will extend smoothly to another.
(1) Sammy is a male homosexual.
(2) Sammy is a faggot.
Of course, using (2) is derogatory in a way that using (1) is not. According to the account under consideration, the use of a slur conventionally implicates derogatory content, which is not implicated by the use of its neutral counterpart. The implicature is conventional, in Grice's sense (1989: ch. 2), rather than conversational since one does not need to calculate the derogatory content expressed by the use of a sentence like (2) by appeal to the principles governing conversational exchange and the circumstances of utterance; indeed, it is unlikely that a hearer unaware that 'faggot' is a pejorative could calculate the derogatory content its use conveys. Moreover, the implicature is not typically cancellable-one cannot sincerely assert (2) and then unilaterally withdraw the derogatory aspect by adding, 'but I have nothing against homosexuals'-but it is detachable-one can replace the slur with its neutral counterpart, as in (1), and thereby avoid any derogation (cf. Williamson 2010: 57 introduce what I will call mixed content: they are predicative of at-issue content, yet introduce a conventional implicature'. He elaborates: 'there are two parts to the meaning of a pejorative expression: an "ordinary" predication of an individual as part of some group, and a negative attitude expressed by the speaker with regard to that individual by virtue of being part of that group' (2010: 2-4).
4
McCready suggests that what the use of a slur conventionally expresses is an attitude which the speaker possesses. But it is hard to see how the mere existence of a convention could guarantee that the subject who employs a slur has the relevant attitude. Indeed, it seems possible for a subject to use a word like 'nigger' and to derogate when doing so even though she happens not to feel contempt toward those to whom the word applies (on an occasion or in general). 5 For this reason, it is better to think of the use of a slur as expressive of the relevant attitude, not as expressing the negative attitude.
6
For reasons mentioned above, it is debateable whether the conventional expression of derision is best described as implicature but, since such a usage is established, and since the relevant disclaimers are now in place, I shall follow suit. 
Yao is a chink.
According to CE, due in part to the fact that the utterer of (3) is appropriately connected to racist institutions, the use of (3) expresses the proposition that Yao ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, and exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, and …., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and …, all because of being Chinese. 
There will never be a chink Prime Minister.
(5) There are no faggots living next door.
(6) My daughter will not marry a nigger.
Plausibly, in uttering (4), one would perform a racist act. But, on Hom's analysis, in uttering (4), one would express the same claim alluded to by:
There will never be a Prime Minister who ought to be subject to higher college admissions standards, and exclusion from advancement to managerial positions, and …., because of being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and …, all because of being Chinese.
Not only is what (7) expresses true, it is not racist; indeed, it seems to express admirably non-racist sentiments. If one extends Hom's analysis to 'faggot' and 'nigger', use of (5) and (6) will similarly turn out not to be derogatory.
The point here is that it is typically no less derogatory to make negative claims using slurs than it is to make positive claims using them, while CE suggests otherwise.
9
Consider next the following exchange:
The US President is a nigger. This 'simple and straightforward' account, as Anderson and Lepore stress, promises to explain why slurs are offensive even when embedded in speech reports or under negation. However, Prohibitionism seems false for a simple and straightforward reason: it is possible for there to be slurs in the absence of taboo or prohibition.
Imagine a deeply racist society in which the use of 'nigger' is not prohibited but nonetheless is expressive of racist thoughts or attitudes concerning those to whom its neutral counterpart applies. Members of the society derogate in using 'nigger', even though they do not violate any prohibition. The word, as used in that society, is surely a slur.
Of course, we might treat that word as prohibited or taboo. But that could only explain why the word is a slur in our socio-linguistic community, not why it is a slur in their community. Moreover, were we not to treat the word in this way, the word would remain a slur. And, were the racist society to become enlightened, its members might look back in shame at their past employment of the now-prohibited slur-it would surely be a mistake to think that the word was not a slur until the prohibition came into force.
Objections to CI
Perhaps there are ways for the proponents of CE or Prohibitionism to respond to the above criticisms. Instead of exploring them, I shall assess the objections to their rival, CI. 10 If those criticisms are unsuccessful, the search for solutions to the above problems lacks motivation. 
NDNA uses
According to CI, the implicature generated by the use of a slur is not cancellable though it is detachable. On this view, Hom states, 'Derogation ought to occur in every context of use for epithets without any means for cancellation. However, […] there 10 Hom (2008: 424) argues that CI's proponent owes an account of the variation in the derogatory force of slurs. For example, 'faggot' is more inflammatory than 'limey', though less inflammatory than 'nigger'. But this is a problem of detail, not principle. CI is a general account of slurs and, in accounting for what is conventionally implicated by the use of a particular slur, one might appeal to the socio-historical circumstances surrounding its use, the kinds of attitudes associated with those who use it, and so forth (cf. n7 above). Hom (2010) and Hom and May (Forthcoming: §8. 3) also appeal to considerations concerning the uses of insults and swear words in objecting to views like CI, which I shall ignore, since I seek only to defend CI as an account of slurs. 11 Anderson and Lepore (Forthcoming: §7) suggest that CI cannot explain why slurs are offensive in contexts in which their content is 'inert'. Consider: '"Nigger" means nigger'. The word 'nigger' as it occurs on the right-hand side of this meaning-attribution is not straightforwardly used, any more than 'nothing' is used as it occurs in: '"Rien" means nothing' (Rundle 2001: 114) . As it is not used, 'nigger' is not expressive of content (derogatory or otherwise). Nonetheless, its use is offensive.
Since I do not know what the correct analysis of meaning-attributions is, I am not in a position to resolve this issue here. For now, I shall only point in the direction of a response. While the expression which occurs on the right-hand side of meaning-attributions like those above is not used, it is not merely mentioned either. 'We can', as Lepore and Anderson note, 'substitute synonyms inside meaning attributions'. So, the meaning-giving expression is neither used nor mentioned; rather, it is 'exhibited'-to use Sellars' helpful term (1997 Sellars' helpful term ( [1956 : §30)-in such a way as to convey the meaning of the mentioned expression on the left-hand side. If the expression exhibited is a slur, then presumably its exhibition conveys derogatory content. The fact that the content of the slur is not wholly inert might suffice to deal with the issue Anderson and Lepore raise.
Anderson and Lepore also claim that the mere mention of a slur can be offensive (Forthcoming: §7). If true, it is hard to see how CI could explain this.
While I do not doubt that the mere mention of a slur can cause offence, I doubt that merely to mention a slur is really to derogate. Witness the readiness of philosophers, linguists and those compiling dictionaries to mention such expressions! Moreover, to the extent that mentioning a slur does cause offence, there is no reason why a proponent of CI could not appeal to the fact, which Anderson and Lepore highlight, that its use is taboo.
are meaningful, felicitous uses of epithets that are non-derogatory ' (2008: 424 In response, the first thing to point out is that it is far from obvious that (8) is felicitously formulated. If 'chink' is being genuinely and straightforwardly used, it is doubtful that it is not derogatory in force, or any less derogatory than it is when it appears in (3) above. The only reason Hom offers for thinking that, as it occurs in (8),
'chink' lacks derogatory force is that it is not being applied. As he says, 'Derogation is the actual application, or predication, of' a slur (2008: 432). However, attention to sentences such as (4-6) remind us that, contra Hom, whether or not the use of an expression is expressive of derogatory content is not determined by whether or not it is being applied; there are contexts in which slurs are not applied but which are expressive of racist or bigoted attitudes. So, Hom's claim that slurs can be straightforwardly used, as in (8), without being expressive of derogatory content is contentious.
For the cases Hom has in mind, in which slurs are put to pedagogical use, it would be more appropriate to formulate the relevant sentences using scare quotes, as follows: This offers a different way, consistent with CI, to understand NDNA uses.
According to it, using a sentence like (9) conventionally implicates derogatory content, though the way in which (9) is formulated allows the speaker to keep that content at arm's length and so prevents an act of genuine derogation taking place.
Unfortunately, this leads to a further concern. If CI is correct, scare quotes notwithstanding, utterances of (9), or for that matter (8), semantically expresses the same content as:
(13) I am Chinese, not Chinese.
While (9) might be offered as an important corrective to the use of racist language, (13) expresses a straightforward contradiction.
I think that the proponent of CI should acknowledge that what is said by the use of (9) What is said or semantically expressed by the utterance of (15) is a contradiction.
Nonetheless, in a given context, it is clear enough what is conversationally implicated, namely that which is expressed by:
(16) I am to be referred to as 'daddy', not as 'father'.
The reason behind this is that, even though 'daddy' and 'father' express the same concepts, 'daddy', unlike 'father', conveys (arguably, as a matter of convention)
feelings of intimacy, affection and dependence.
So, the sort of story a proponent of CI might tell with respect to what NDNA uses of slurs are expressive of is, not only coherent, but one which one would want to tell with respect to analogous uses of non-pejorative expressions. NDNA uses, then, do not pose a serious challenge to CI.
Partners in crime
Hom argues that CI has 'the unintuitive result that certain racist claims are trivially true ' (2008: 424) . Consider: (17) is true, 'This certainly seems to make us complicit in the racist's racist attitude, and thus to some extent racists ourselves ' (2008: 13) .
The proponent of CI is certainly committed to thinking that what is said by an utterance of (17) is true, since it expresses the very same content as an utterance of:
(18) Chinese are Chinese.
The task for the proponent of CI is to show that this is not an objectionable consequence of her view, in part by accounting for our reluctance to acknowledge it.
One reason it is 'unintuitive' to think that (17) expresses a truth and for being reluctant to acknowledge that it does is that, typically, saying that a sentence expresses a truth is, among other things, a roundabout way of endorsing the use of that sentence. Indeed, it is a platitude that truth makes for correct assertion, so to say that one expresses a truth in uttering a sentence assertorically is, in effect, to say that what one does is correct, i.e. that one is not doing as one should not in uttering that sentence.
If that is right, CI can explain why one would be reluctant to acknowledge that an utterance of (17) expresses a truth (even if one is a proponent of CI). To say that (17) is true is uncomfortably close to endorsing its use, to judging that one is not doing as one should not in uttering it. If CI is right, it is no surprise that one would be loath to say this, since the act of uttering (17) is (as a matter of convention) expressive of racist attitudes.
So, CI can certainly account for the feeling that to acknowledge the truth of what (17) expresses is to be complicit in the act of derogation its utterance commits.
Of course, according to CI, it is not strictly-speaking wrong to say of (17) that it expresses a truth, even an analytic or necessary truth; in saying this, one is only endorsing what is said, not how it is said, one is only judging that one is not doing as one should not in asserting what one does, rather than in asserting it in the way one does. Moreover, according to CI, it is not racist to say of (17) that it expresses a truth, since what is said in an utterance of (17) is not racist, only what is conventionally implicated by the use of a slur to say it. To say all of this is evidently not to say that, if CI is correct, there are no grounds for objecting to an utterance of (17); on the contrary, if CI is correct, such an utterance is objectionable since it constitutes an act of derogation.
In light of this, it is tendentious for Hom to say that, if CI is true, 'certain racist claims are trivially true'; it is precisely the view of CI's proponent that what is claimed in uttering (17), and so what is true, is not racist, though, of course, claiming it by uttering (17) is. The force of Hom's criticism seems to trade on an act/object oring/-ed ambiguity.
The proponent of CI can in this way show that it is not an objectionable consequence of her view that the same thing is said by uses of (17) and (18).
Nonetheless, (17) and (18) Fortunately, the explanation here is straightforward. Two sentences differ in cognitive significance just in case it is possible for a rational subject to understand both sentences while taking different attitudes toward them (cf. Evans 1982: 19) .
Since (17) involves a slur while (18) does not, and (so) since (17) is expressive of racist attitudes while (18) is not, it is no surprise that a rational subject who understands both might take different attitudes toward them.
IQ tests
Recall that a conventional implicature is detachable. So, if uttering a sentence involving a slur like 'faggot' conventionally implicates certain bigoted attitudes or ideas, it should be possible to detach that implicature by using a sentence involving a different expression, for example 'male homosexual', while saying the same thing. 
A modal-conceivability argument
Hom and May (Forthcoming: §8.2) object to views like CI by appeal to the following argument:
(i) It's conceivable for there to be Jews without kikes.
(ii) Whatever is conceivable is possible.
(iii) Therefore it's possible for there to be Jews without kikes.
The conclusion of this argument is clearly inconsistent with CI, since, according to CI, the terms 'Jew' and 'Kike' are co-extensive. 15 As Camp stresses, 'In developing a theory we need to cover their full range of uses: in particular, not only as weapons of verbal abuse, but also in relaxed conversation with bigots. We should not let the outrage that slurs produce in many hearers, including ourselves, blind us either to what bigots take themselves to be doing in using them, or to how their fellow bigots might receive them' (this volume). 16 For a similar line of thought, developed independently and in a different context, see Schroeder 2009: 304-305. One might reject (ii) by denying that conceivability entails possibility. I shall not pursue this, since the proponent of CI must reject (i). Given CI, what one says in advancing the first premise is just what would one say were one to advance:
(i*) It's conceivable for there to be Jews without Jews.
Evidently, this is inconsistent.
Hom and May argue that this makes matters worse for the proponent of CI. If the premises are inconsistent, the conclusion necessarily follows! I fail to see the problem here. If CI is correct, then the modal-conceivability argument is valid. But this commits the proponent of CI to accepting its conclusion only if she is committed to its premises. Since the first premise (by the lights of CI) is inconsistent, the proponent of CI is not committed to it and should reject it.
This leaves the proponent of CI the task of explaining away the apparent plausibility of (i), of accounting for why it might seem to us that the relevant state of affairs is genuinely conceivable. One can certainly conceive of a world in which Jews are not subject to derogation through the use of slurs, a world in which 'kike' is not used, or at least not used with its current meaning. It is the conceivability of this situation, I venture, which lies behind the intuitiveness of the first premise.
Conclusion
In 
